Lecture Auction Theory (Winter 2012/13)
This lecture is equivalent to MW24.5
for students from the Master program
- Tue., 8:15-9:45, Carl Zeiss Str. 3, SR 120
- 10-12, Universitätshauptgebäude, Fürstengraben 1, HS144
- This lecture will be given in English.
- Audience: The lecture is targeted at advanced Master students.
Students should be familiar with Game Theory,
Probability and Statistics.
Auctions belong to the oldest and perhaps most robust
economic institutions. Auctions help us to understand how prices are
reached and how information is aggregated with the help of decentral
- Topics: Standard types of auctions, efficiency and revenue in the case of private
values, risk aversion, experimental evidence, auctions with
interdependent valuations, winner's curse, common values, experimental
evidence, affiliated values, uncertainty over the number of bidders,
multiple units, combinatorial auctions.
- Cassidy R., 1967. Auctions and Auctioneering, Berkeley: University of California press.
- Kagel, J. H., 1995. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
(eds). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kagel, J. H. and D. Levin, 2002. Bidding in Common Value Auctions: A
Survey of Experimental Research, in Common-Value Auctions and the
Winner's Curse, Princeton University Press.
- Vijay Krishna, 2002. Auction Theory, Academic Press (this is the main text for this course).
- Klemperer P., (Ed.), 2000. The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Klemperer, P., 1999. Auction Theory: A guide to the Literature,
Journal of Economic Surveys, 13: 227-260. CEPR
- Klemperer, P., 2000. Why every economist should learn some auction
theory. invited paper from the Econometric Society World
- McAfee, R.P., and J. McMillan, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal
of Economic Literature, 25:699-738. Jstor
- Wilson, R., 1992. "Strategic Analysis of Auctions," in R.J. Aumann and
S. Hart, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.Paper
- Mechanisms in general
- Auctions today
- Equivalence among auctions
- Aims when choosing an auction format
- Symmetric private values
- Second price auctions
- Digression: Some game theory
- First price auctions
- Digression: Random variables
- Random variables
- Hazard Rates
- Joint distributions
- Order statistics
- First price auctions (bids, revenue, and risk)
- Reserve prices
- Revenue equivalence
- Using the revenue equivalence principle
- Risk aversion
- Interdependent values
- Please send feedback and questions to firstname.lastname@example.org.