Seminar Quantitative Economics Winter 2018/19

Learning aims:
During the seminar participants will learn discussing and and presenting current economic research.
Thursdays, 8-10., SR129 (no seminar in the first week, the seminar starts on 25 October)
The Lecture MW24.2 might be helpful but is not a formal requirement.
Formal requirements:
This seminar is open to Bachelor and Master students. Please consult your examination regulations.
  • In the first week I will present an introduction to the seminar. Students do not have to prepare a presentation for this week. (here is a handout with my notes)
  • Articles will be presented in groups of three to four participants using different presentation methods.

    We will start with the first article from the list below. Each week we will decide which students are in charge of the presentation for the subsequent week.

  • All participants will contribute (in each week) to the discussion of the article.
  • All participants will submit (before the end of the term) an essay of about 1500 words (+/- 10%, formulae, tables and bibliography do not count). For this essay, keep in mind some remarks that might help you in the preparation of your essay and your presentation
  • All assignments count for the grade (This includes presentation of own research as well as discussion of the research of the other students).
  • As seminar BW24.3 for Bachelor students;
  • As seminar MW24.4 for Master students in Economics.
We expect advanced achievements and skills from students in advanced study programs.

Students who miss a session due to health reasons (or any other reason) can present a certificate from their GP within three days, otherwise this session will count as a “fail” (5). To pass the seminar, students participate (in a constructive way) in at least 70% of the sessions.

  • Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
  • Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
  • Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
  • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
  • Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
  • Dan Ariely & Uri Gneezy & George Loewenstein & Nina Mazar, 2009. "Large stakes and big mistakes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 451-469.
  • Uri Gneezy & John A List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1365-1384, September.
  • Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
  • Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
  • Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2009. "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 544-555, March.