Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions

Oliver Kirchkamp, Shulin Liu, Wladislaw Mill and Xiangyu Wang

We analyze the effects of spite in first-price all-pay auctions. We find that symmetric equilibria of spiteful bidders increase in spite, and that spite could explain overbidding. We compare the symmetric equilibria of spiteful bidders in first-price all-pay auctions with those of spiteful bidders in second-price all-pay auctions, as well as with those in first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions (FPA and SPA).

JEL: C72; D44; D82.

Keywords: All-pay auctions, Overbidding Spite

• On 20 June 2025 the paper has been accepted for publication in Economic Letters, in press.

This paper is based on an earlier working paper, CESifo Working Paper No. 7631 by Kirchkamp and Mill (2019). Part of this CESifo Working Paper No. 7631 was published as Kirchkamp and Mill (2021), however, without any insights on the first-price all-pay auctions. This current revised paper focuses solely on the insights for the first-price all-pay auction, which have not been published, yet.

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