The Effect of Power Imbalances on Incentives to Make Non-Contractible Investments
JEL-Classification: C91, D23, D86
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts, Relationship-Specific Investment, Allocation of Power, Social Preferences, Experiments.
- An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment”. This paper is available as a Jena Economc Research Paper 2009-016.
- A more recent version (as of January 2010) is CESifo Working Paper No. 2933
- Here is the most recent version as of September 21, 2012.
- Here are the data and empirical methods used in the paper.
- On March 26, 2013, the paper has been accepted for publication at the European Economic Review, Vol. 61, pp. 169-185.