Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoners' Dilemmas Experiments: First Results
Abstract:We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.
JEL-Classification: C72, C92, D74, D83, H41, R12
Keywords: Local interaction, experiments, prisoner's dilemma, reinforcement, repeated games.
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- Oliver Kirchkamp, Rosemarie Nagel (2001), “Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoners' Dilemmas Experiments: First Results”, Homo Ökonomicus, XVIII(2) 2001, pp. 319-336.