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SFB 504 discussion paper No. 00-50:

Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoners' Dilemmas Experiments: First Results

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

Abstract:

We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.

JEL-Classification: C72, C92, D74, D83, H41, R12

Keywords: Local interaction, experiments, prisoner's dilemma, reinforcement, repeated games.